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Abstract
This Essay discusses organized crime and corruption in Russia and their effects on US busi-
nesses and US foreign policy. This Essay recommends that US businesses operating in Russia
take steps to ensure that their local offices and representatives in Russia are not violating the anti-
bribery laws of the United States. This Essay also recommends that the US Government create a
procedure for Russian and foreign businesses, in cooperation with the Russian Government, for
reporting requests for bribes from Russian Government officials. Finally, this Essay recommends
that US anti-bribery laws be amended to provide US businesses with the right to commence civil
actions against companies and individuals who make illegal bribes to the competitive detriment of
US firms.
ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION IN
RUSSIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Scott P. Boylan*
I. SUMMARY
This Essay is both a warning and a recommendation. It is a
warning to U.S businesses and businessmen that bribing Russian
Government officials is a risky and illegal process under both
Russian and U.S. laws. It is also a warning to the U.S. Govern-
ment that the bribery of Russian Government officials by U.S.
and foreign businesses and businessmen is seriously undermin-
ing the transformation to democracy in Russia.
This Essay recommends that U.S. businesses operating in
Russia take steps to ensure that their local offices and represent-
atives in Russia are not violating the anti-bribery laws of the
United States. This Essay also recommends that the U.S. Gov-
ernment create a procedure for Russian and foreign businesses,
in cooperation with the Russian Government, for reporting re-
quests for bribes from Russian Government officials. Finally, this
Essay recommends that U.S. anti-bribery laws be amended to
provide U.S. businesses with the right to commence civil actions
against companies and individuals who make illegal bribes to the
competitive detriment of U.S. firms.
II. INTRODUCTION
Corruption has become a way of life for government offi-
cials in Russia.' Bribe-taking, in fact, is a widespread practice
throughout the Russian bureaucracy.' A number of U.S. and
* L.L.M. Georgetown University (1991); J.D. Syracuse University (1985); B.A.
Franklin & Marshall College (1982). The Author is Senior Projects Coordinator at the
American Bar Association-Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI)
where he works on the United States Department of Justice/ABA-CEELI Organized
Crime and Corruption Project in the former Soviet Union and Central Europe with a
focus on Russia. From 1993 to 1995, he lived and worked in Russia on democracy
training programs for Russian democratic activists and government officials.
1. Somebody Put a Dollar Bill in His Hand, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, Dec. 23, 1994, at
2.
2. See Nothing for Nothing, RossisKAYA GAZETA, Jan. 6, 1993, at 2. The Author notes
that when U.S. businesses negotiate commercial contracts with their Russian counter-
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other Western businesses and businessmen routinely pay bribes
to Russian government officials in order to conduct their busi-
nesses in Russia.3 Indeed, the most prevalent crime in Russia
today is bribery.4 Of those charged with bribery and corruption
in Russia in 1993, over forty-two percent were government offi-
cials5 and over twenty-five percent were law enforcement of-
ficers.6 Not only do Russian officials routinely accept and even
demand bribes,7 they have also entered into an illicit partnership
with organized crime and with clandestine business groups.'
Former Communist apparachiks, who continue to work within
the Russian bureaucracy, exploit previously made black-
marketeer relationships to profit in the new post-Revolutionary
Russian system.9 Thus, a partnership formed long before the at-
tempted coup of 1991 by organized crime and Communist gov-
ernment officials now threatens the growth of democracy in Rus-
sia.1 0
parts, they are often, indeed always, requested to pay government officials for the lat-
ters' acquiescence in the deal. These officials represent a wide range, from low-level
bureaucrats to high-ranking Russian government employees.
3. See Von Der Heydt, Russia's Spiritual Wilderness, 70 POL'Y REv. 12 (1994).
4. To Whom Belongs Power in Russia? Ministry of Thieves-in-Law: An Attempt at Break-
ing into Politics, IzvErsTIA, July 20, 1994, at 1, 5 [hereinafter lzvr.sTIA.
5. George Nikides, Journalists Hit TV Mafiya, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at 10.
While virtually all activities were controlled by the Government in the former Soviet
Union, there are now a large number of government officials working in what is now
the private sector. Id. As the Author notes:
[C]orruption in advertising on [Russian] state television began seven years
ago, when executives first debated the cost of a minute of air time. They came
up with a figure of 2,000 rubles a minute, a price so low it invited executives to
demand additional payment, or bribe, of 10,000 rubles before an ad would go
on the air.
Id. On November 7, 1994, the exchange rate was approximately 3200 Rubles for one
U.S. dollar. Id.
6. Id.
7. Leonid Zhukhevitsky, Crash Course for International Businessmen, Part II, THE Rus-
stAN, June 1995, at 66.
8. To Whom Belongs Power in Russia?, supra note 4, at 1, 5. According to Russian
police sources, there has been a gradual alliance formed between Mafiya organizations,
Russian government bureaucrats, and legitimate and illegitimate businessmen. As a
result of this alliance, 70% of the privatization auctions were shams where the buyer was
selected well in advance. Money Talks, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1994, at 10. Corruption
"risks causing political unrest or, no better, a backlash against free-market reform." Id.
9. Post-Revolutionary Russian system refers to the period after the Revolution of
1991.
10. See To Whom Belongs Power in Russia?, supra note 4, at 1, 5; Money Talks, supra
note 8, at 10. STEPHEN HANDLEMAN, COMRADE CRiMINAL 55-56 (1995). The Author
notes that criminality "was at the heart of the Soviet system .... The huge profits that
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Not only does the Mafiya 11 kill and steal in Russia, it does so
in the United States as well.1 2 The Russian Mafiya is increasingly
engaged in crime in the West.1 Mafiya members are involved in
"theft, extortion, money-laundering, 4  gun-trafficking, drug
running, prostitution, smuggling, loan sharking, contract killing
and more."' 5 The U.S. Department ofJustice ("DOJ") has estab-
lished task forces to deal with the Russian Mafiya in New York,
Los Angeles, and Miami. Thus, U.S. businesses that pay bribes
and protection money in Russia may be unwittingly financing
Russian criminal activity back in the United States.1 6 As one
commentator notes, businessmen:
[W]ho pay protection money to the Russian Mafia are help-
ing to cement anarchy for years to come and prevent the es-
tablishment of the rule of law in Russia. And those who hope
that their compromises will in the long run promote the pen-
etration of a less corrupt "Western Culture" are lying to them-
selves. If Russia recovers, it will be despite and not because of
the Mafia, despite and not because of passive collaboration by
17foreign businessmen.'.
Clearly, it is not in the best interests of the United States for
Russia to become a criminal oligarchy. Following the demolition
the crime lords began to earn in the black market could only have been possible with
the tacit approval, if not the open cooperation, of government authorities and police."
Id.
11. See Stephen Handelman, The Russian Mafiya, FOR. AFF., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 2.
"Mafiya" is the transliteration from Russian. Id. As discussed below, the Russian Mafiya
is different from the Sicilian mafia. Id. The two terms should be differentiated; thus
the difference in spelling. Id.
12. Allan Friedman, The Organizatsiya: Brooklyn's Booming Russian Mob is Slicker,
Smarter, and Much Meaner than La Cosa Nostra, N.Y. MAO., Nov. 7, 1994, at 50.
Just a few years ago, the FBI denied there even was a Russian mob. But five
months ago, in the wake of at least fifteen gang-hit murders in Brighton Beach
and evidence of a burgeoning alliance between Russian gangsters and the Ital-
ian Mafia, the FBI set up an elite squad to combat what experts say is the most
important organized crime wave of the nineties .... The Russian mob... has
more than 300 members in the New York area alone, making it larger than the
Bonanno, Colombo, or Lucchese crime families.
Id.
13. Daniel Kiaidman, How To Police an Ex-Police State, LEGAL TIMES, July 11, 1994, at
12.
14. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 131-43.
15. Id.
16. Ulrich Schmid, The Russian Mafia and the Rule of Law, Swiss REv. OF WORLD
ArF., Oct. 3, 1994, at 1.
17. Id.
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of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, many
observers were euphoric about a potential future partnership be-
tween the United States and other Western democracies and a
new democratic Russia. In some ways this type of partnership
has emerged, but it has not been free of problems. The initial
euphoria has been tempered by the sobering facts of reality. Op-
timism has surrendered to pessimism as the reality of Russia's
difficult transition from a command government, economy, and
society to a liberal government, economy, and society has
presented Russia and the World with enormous and difficult
challenges. It is now apparent that a major hurdle for Russia on
the road to democracy is the issue of crime and official corrup-
tion.
Recent visits to Russia by U.S. law enforcement officials have
made it clear that the U.S. Government is concerned about
crime and corruption in Russia.' 8 The Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), Louis Freeh, has said that the
growth of organized crime in Russia and Eastern Europe is a
"threat to the integrity of government." 9 The Russian people
have also expressed their deep concern about crime and its neg-
ative impact upon reform in Russia. President Boris Yeltsin 2 ° has
expressed concern about Mafiya influence in government and
has said that "organized crime is persistently trying to gain access
to Big Politics and the machinery of state.""
The success of Russian democracy represents a fundamental
pillar of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Government spends mil-
lions of U.S. tax dollars to promote democratic and market, eco-
nomic reforms in Russia. Meanwhile, U.S. businesses and busi-
nessmen who pay bribes to Russian government officials may be
unwitting supporters of organized crime in Russia. More impor-
18. Lee Hockstader, Moscow Insists Criminals Can't Get at Nuclear Weapons, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., July 1, 1994, at 2. Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") visited Russia "to focus attention on increased threats from inter-
national crime groups, terrorism and drug trafficking." Id. Director Freeh had previ-
ously testified before Congress that the FBI was concerned that nuclear materials from
Russia could find their way into the hands of organized crime or terrorist groups in the
West and that this constitutes "the greatest long term threat to the security of the
United States." Id.
19. Klaidman, supra, note 13, at 12.
20. See R.W. Apple, Jr., V-E Day Plus 50: The Overview; Allied Victory in Europe Is
Commemorated in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1995, at Al (discussing Boris Yeltsin, Presi-
dent of Russia, in V-E Day celebration in Moscow).
21. IZvEsTiA, supra note 4, at 5.
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tantly, bribery of Russian government officials undercuts efforts
to create an open and democratic government in Russia.22 The
U.S. Government should not permit the U.S. business commu.-
nity in Russia to work at cross-purposes with U.S. foreign policy
by indirectly financing criminal activity in Russia and the United
States.
The current Administration in Washington is searching for
means to combat the rise of crime and criminal elements in Rus-
sia.2 3 Indeed, it is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and the
key to the post-Cold War era that democracy take root and flour--
ish in Russia. Much effort is being made by the United States
and other democratic nations to assist Russia in its metamorpho-
sis from a corrupt totalitarian regime to a popular democracy.
These nations should, therefore, not tolerate support of corrupt
officials and organizations by private businesses in direct contra.-
diction to this policy.
The United States currently has the means to combat the
payment of bribes by U.S. citizens to corrupt Russian Govern-
ment officials through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
("FCPA") .24 Unfortunately, U.S. officials have failed to vigor-
ously enforce this legal mechanism vis-it-vis corrupt practices in
Russia and the former Soviet Union.
The FCPA prohibits the payment of bribes or other illicit
payments to government officials.2" Congress enacted the law to
prohibit the payment of bribes to foreign government officials
and to prevent any adverse effects such illicit payments would
and could have on U.S. foreign policy, foreign governments, and
U.S. businesses operating abroad.26
The U.S. business community in Russia should be aware
22. Klaidman, supra, note 13, at 12.
23. Id. at 1. The Director of the FBI took a tour of Russia and Eastern Europe
during which he constantly stressed the need for international police cooperation in
combating the "new tyranny" of international organized crime. Id. The United States
is not alone in the effort to thwart organized crime on an international level. Id. The
United Nations has begun to focus on organized crime, which has become increasing
international in scope. See UN Gears Up for Landmark Conference on Organized Crime, Mos-
cow TRIB., Nov. 11, 1994, at 4. International organized crime also involves "corruption
among officials at all levels [of government] and undermines the confidence people
have in their government's ability to uphold the law." Id.
24. S. REP. No. 114,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.CA.N.
4098, 4101.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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that the U.S. Government will likely seek to enforce this law with
all due diligence.27 U.S. law enforcement agencies have already
begun to cooperate with Russian authorities in combating organ-
ized crime and corruption. It is only a matter of time, and per-
haps another Russian election, before Russian and U.S. law en-
forcement agencies recognize the potential of the FCPA in fight-
ing official corruption in Russia. U.S. businesses should take
care that they are operating in Russia in a manner that does not
work at cross-purposes with U.S. foreign policy by taking steps to
ensure that their Russian operations fully comply with the FCPA.
Only by doing so will they avoid what may prove to be crushing
losses to their economic and business interests in the future. 8
The current "Wild East"29 atmosphere in Russia, hopefully,
will not endure. As Russia moves toward the establishment of
democratic rule and a market economy, it is highly unlikely that
rampant bribery of government officials will continue to be tol-
erated or that past illegal conduct will be easily forgiven. En-
forcement and punishment of such practices will begins0 and
U.S. businesses that do not rectify their conduct in accordance
with FCPA may encounter severe problems in the future.
III. THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE RISE OF
THE MAF1YA
With the fall of the Soviet Union and rise of market reforms
in Russia, a then-existing group consisting of corrupt criminal
officials, ex-black-marketeers, and common criminals took ad-
vantage of the lack of commercial regulation and crumbling po-
lice power to prey on the nascent commercial enterprises of the
resurrected Russia."1 The Mafiya is not a new force in Russia. 2
27. 126 CONG. Rac. S2550 (daily ed. May 28, 1980).
28. Id.; Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearings on S. 708
Before the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary
Policy of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1981) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 708]. Lockheed Corporation recently paid a
US$24.8 million fine for violating the FCPA. Id.
29. See Seymour Hersh, The Wild East, ATATric MoNTHLY, June 1994, at 61. Mr.
Hersh notes that "organized crime has strangled business in Russia, and is now reaching
for the nation's nuclear stockpile." Id.
30. The Author knows that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") investiga-
tions are currently being conducted in Russia. It is likely that the number will increase
if the Yeltsin Administration is replaced in the June 1996 elections.
31. Handelman, supra note 11, at 67-72.
32. Yuri Shchekochikhin, Where does the "Mafiya" Come From?, 2 DEMO4RATIZATSIYA
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The entire Soviet system has long operated with a flourishing
black-market supervised and controlled by this group."3 The
black-market is a key to understanding not only the history of
the Soviet Union, but also the problems Russia is presently fac-
ing in its gradual transformation into a democratic, free market
society.3 4 The black-market and trade Mafiya has long existed in
Russia. It flourished during the Brezhnev years and in the
1980's.3 5
The virtually unregulated market in Russia has created a
wealth of opportunities for criminal organizations, from the
shake-down of small kiosk operators for protection money3 6 to
the peddling of stolen nuclear fuel on the international mar-
ket." Official corruption is rampant. In 1995, criminal pro-
ceedings were instituted against two-thousand employees of the
Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.3 8
IV. DEMOCRATIC REFORMS IN RUSSIA:
THREATENED BY CRIME
In a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation in
1994, only fourteen percent of Russians living in Moscow said
192 (1994). Some have dated the first appearance of organized crime in the former
Soviet Union to the late 1960's, when the reform-minded Nikita Krushchev loosened
just a little bit of the restraints on the Soviet citizens. Id.
33. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 64.
34. Id.
35. See Shchekochikhin, supra note 32, at 192-94. By the end of the Brezhnev era,
corruption "had reached such heights that it was possible to bribe your way out of any
situation." Id.; COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 31-34. Organized crime had its
beginnings in Russia with organized peasant bands in the sixteenth century. Id. The
serfs who worked the land and the land itself belonged to the Czar. Id. As robbing
government functionaries took on a Robin Hoodesque image, the lines between bandi-
try and brigandry blurred. Id. Stealing from the state was viewed by some as an act of
political rebellion and not simply crime, a mindset that reemerged during the Soviet
era. Id. The repressive Czarist Government was succeeded by an equally or more re-
pressive Communist regime. Id. Stealing from both regimes was seen by many as an act
of rebellion and by many more as simply justified. Id.
36. See Von Der Heydt, supra note 3, at 12.
37. See Hersh, supra note 29, at 61 (commenting that "organized crime has stran-
gled business in Russia, and is now reaching for the nation's nuclear stockpile"); see also
COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 224-27.
38. Some Results of the Last Year, OGONEK, Jan. 1996, at 10. In the Tula Oblast,
government money intended to purchase food for residents was given by government
officials to a private company that transferred the money to banks overseas. Id.; see
Zhudakayev, IzvEsTiA, Dec. 28, 1995, reprinted in FBIS-SOV (Suppl. Issue), Jan. 12, 1996,
at 35.
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they considered Russia a democracy. 39 Twenty-three percent of
Russians living in urban areas believe that organized crime, not
the Government, runs the country.4 0 One U.S. Government offi-
cial notes that "the Russian criminal organizations not only
threaten government authority but, in some instances, are
viewed by citizens as alternatives to state authority because of the
service they supply."4" Those Russians who do not view criminal
organizations in a positive light seem willing to tolerate extreme
measures to combat crime. 42
Government officials in the United States, from the White
House to Capitol Hill, have expressed concern about crime in
Russia and its threat to democratic reforms.43 In testimony
before Congress in 1994, Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") James Woolsey commented outright that organ-
ized crime was a threat to democratic reform in Russia. '  Rus-
sian bankers agree with the CIA and have called upon President
Yeltsin to provide bankers with protection from organized
crime.45 Bank managers and officials who are not willing to as-
sist the Russian Mafiya are, and have been, routinely assassinated
39. Poll Queries Democracy, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at 4 (poll conducted by
Public Opinion Foundation at Interfax).
40. Pyotr Yudin, City Dwellers Think Power Lies with Mafia, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 9,
1994, at 4.
41. Mafia Rules Russia: CIA, Moscow TRIB., Sept. 28, 1994, at 4 (quoting statement
of James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA")). Among the serv-
ices provided by organized crime in Russia are:
[S]ecurity in the form of protection for individuals and property, arbitration
in the form of settling disputes, or seeing that business contracts are honored,
financial assistance in the form of loans, often at lower rates than banks, and
even some social services such as assistance to the needy through criminally
owned philanthropic organizations.
Id.
42. Hockstader, supra note 18, at 2. Law and order were the primary reasons peo-
ple voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 1993 parliamentary elections in
Russia. Id. Yeltsin issued a decree that took effect in June 1993 allowing the police to
hold a suspect for up to 30 days without bringing charges and giving police expanded
powers to search homes and offices. Id.
43. See Mafia Rules Russia: CIA, supra note 41, at 4. CIA Director Woolsey notes
that the implications of organized crime influence in Russia and its negative impact on
democratic reforms are "enormous." Handelman, supra note 11, at 88 (noting that
Russian authorities readily acknowledge that mixture of unbridled capitalism, organ-
ized crime, and official chicanery has produced crisis of governance).
44. Mafia Rules Russia: CIA, supra note 41, at 4.
45. See Open Letter, KOMSOMLSKAYA PRAVDA, July 17, 1994, at 1 (noting that "killings
occur when banks refuse to pay the mafia either protection money or loans .... Vio-
lence has become a means of intimidating bankers and the ministry and the prosecu-
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by organized crime groups. 46 To combat this wave of terrorism
against bankers, in 1994 the Association of Russian Bankers
hired as its director a former Russian Interior Ministry official
who is spearheading lobbying efforts to convince the Govern-
ment to provide better protection for banks and bankers against
crime.47 U.S. businessmen have also been threatened with vio-
lence by criminal groups. 48
Moreover, the crime wave in Russia has, indirectly, already
had a strongly negative impact on democratic reforms. 49 Rus-
sians have become disheartened with democratic reform, and
have begun to equate democracy with lawlessness and a sharp
decrease in personal safety and well-being.
In an effort to combat rising crime and corruption within
the Government, President Boris Yeltsin promulgated a strin-
gent decree to fight crime that grants the police the right to de-
tain a criminal suspect for up to thirty days before bringing for-
mal charges.5 ° Ironically, many view this decree as a blow to
democratic reform in Russia. 1 The Russian Duma 2 passing a
resolution by 279 votes to 10, held that Yeltsin's decree "restricts
the constitutional rights and citizen's freedom without sufficient
basis."5 3
In addition, a conservative version of an organized crime
tor's office has been reluctant to take on organized crime."); Paul Podolsky, New Bank
Chief to Fight Crime, Moscow TIMES, May 19, 1994, at 14.
46. See Peter Fuhrman, The Man from Most, FORBES, Dec. 5, 1994, at 78. Such de-
velopments lead to the suspicion that successful Russian banks are somehow connected
to the Mafiya and "crooked" politicians. Id.
47. Podolsky, supra note 45, at 14.
48. Irina Dyomina, The New Klondike Myth Is Dispelled, Moscow NEws, Aug. 26-
Sept. 1, 1994, at 11.
49. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 315-16.
50. Hockstader, supra note 18, at 2.
51. Klaidman, supra note 13, at 13. Sergei Sirotkin, Vice Chairman of the Presi-
dential Commission for Human Rights called Yeltsin's ukase (or decree) a violation of
the Russian Constitution and of basic human rights. Id. He was also very critical of the
Director of the FBI for tacitly endorsing the ukase. Id.; Abraham Brumberg, Building a
Democracy, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at 8 (noting that "the decree on crime ...
flagrantly violates basic human rights and several critical articles of the new [Russian]
constitution").
52. The "Russian State Duma," ("Duma") referred to in this Essay is the lower
house of the Russian national legislature, a body that is roughly equivalent in size to the
U.S. House of Representatives.
53. Thomas deWaal, Crime Decree Flouts Law, Duma Charges, Moscow TIMES, June
23, 1994, at 3. Many members of the Duma were concerned that the decree could be
used against them by the executive branch. Id.
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bill currently pending in the Duma, "would set up special courts
of three professional judges to rule on matters involving organ-
ized crime, require that banks report on any suspicious activity
by their clients and give law enforcers the power to provoke sus-
pects into criminal actions."54 Liberals in the Duma have criti-
cized this bill, arguing "that the special courts would barely differ
from the notorious troikas set up by Joseph Stalin to persecute
political opponents without a proper trial."55 Such undemo-
cratic tendencies in the Russian Government are being fueled by
official corruption and crime. Since most Russian government
officials gained their experience in the totalitarian Soviet re-
gime, the solutions they formulate in response to crime and cor-
ruption often draw on this "totalitarian" experience. Demo-
cratic principles of restraint are often overlooked. Indeed, it is
difficult not to doubt the sincerity of the anti-crime political
rhetoric when many of these same officials are "profiting from
the legal chaos of New Russia."56
V. CRIME IN RUSSIA
Crime and its impact on the development of democracy is
the primary concern of many Russian politicians. As mentioned
above, President Boris Yeltsin has taken strong measures against
crime in his anti-crime decree, even as the Law has alarmed de-
fenders of individual and human rights in the Russian Duma.57
Still other members of the Russian legislature have expressed
concern that Russia will become a criminalized society if eco-
nomic reform is not pushed through the Russian Duma and cor-
rupt influences are not eliminated from government. 58
Russian politicians themselves have not been immune from
the crime wave gripping Russia. A Communist member of the
Duma died on November 5, 1994, from head injuries sustained
in an attack near the entrance to his home in Moscow four days
earlier.59 The Communist Party issued a statement stating that:
54. Leonid Bershidsky, Duma Passes Disputed Media Law, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 11,
1994, at 3.
55. Id.
56. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 285.
57. Id.
58. Russia's Choice Is Reform or Crime, Moscow TRIB., Apr. 14, 1994, at 10.
59. Charles Hecker & Pyotr Yudin, Deputies' Murder Shakes Duma, Moscow TiuB.,
Nov. 9, 1994, at 1.
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The tragic death of our comrade is not a coincidence - it is
a direct result of the outburst of crime, lawlessness and chaos
in society which has occurred because of the loss of govern-
ance in the country, and the paralysis of its structures of au-
thority.60
In April 1994, another Russian Member of Parliament ("MP") 61
was gunned down in front of his home on the outskirts of Mos-
cow in a gang-style shooting.62 In commenting on this incident,
members of the Duma have expressed their-displeasure with hav-
ing to serve alongside other members of the Duma who are con-
nected, or believed to be connected, to organized crime
groups.6 In fact, Mafiya leaders actually encourage criminals to
seek seats in the Duma because of the broad immunity con-
ferred on those elected to the Russian parliament,64 and it is a
well-known fact that a number of individuals have run for office
solely to avoid prison sentences.65 One operator who established
a large pyramid scheme to bilk thousands of Russians out of mil-
lions of dollars actually avoided detention by successfully run-
ning for a seat in the Duma.66 Following the December 1995
Duma elections, the Russian Central Election Commission noted
that over seventy of the registered candidates seeking election
have criminal records or criminal charges pending against
them.67 President Yeltsin even informed regional leaders at the
time that "some candidates had already come under pressure to
drop out of December's [1995] election to boost the chances of
60. Id. It is conceivable that the Communist Party sees crime as a possible vehicle
to assist its return to power, a development that would severely threaten democracy in
Russia.
61. "MP," or member of parliament, is the acronym used in this Essay to refer to a
member of the Russian Duma.
62. Pyotr Yudin, Motive for Murder Unknown, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 28, 1994, at 1.
63. In a meeting with members of the Russian Duma, I was told that there was
concern that criminal elements were buying seats on party lists and elections with funds
procured from Russian banks, widely believed to be controlled by organized crime and
corrupt Government officials.
64. Ingra Saffron, Run for Legislature in Russia and Beat the Rap: Murder? Fraud?
Lawmakers Have Immunity from Nearly Every Prosecution, PHIL. INQUIRER, Oct. 21, 1995, at
AI; Law on Status ofDeputies, FBIS-SOV-94-072, Apr. 14, 1994. Members of the Duma
receive nearly complete immunity from prosecution. Id.
65. Saffron, supra note 64, at Al.
66. Id.
67. Monitor: A Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States, OMRI DAILY REPORT, PART I,
Oct. 26, 1995.
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criminals getting elected."6 8
Members of the Duma have also been linked to organized
crime. 69 Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the ultranationalist Lib-
eral Democratic Party, is alleged to have received hundreds of
thousands of dollars for the party's most recent electoral cam-
paign, held in 1992, from reputed gangsters.7"
Top government officials have admitted that the Russian
bureaucracy and police organizations have joined with organ-
ized crime to become the chief antagonist of independent busi-
nessmen. 71 As one observer notes, "the unofficial alliance be-
tween [Russian] officialdom and criminal syndicates is no se-
cret."72  Russian businessmen are afraid to register their
companies with local governments for fear of having their finan-
cial information passed on to criminal groups who will then use
the information to extort money from them.75
A. The Mafiya
It is important to clarify the point referred to above that the
Russian Mafiya differs from the Italian mafia as the latter has
been portrayed in "The Godfather" and other movies. In some
respects, the Russian Mafiya is even more frightening because it
represents a virtual, if not actual, partnership between govern-
ment officials and criminals. 74 Many believe that this corrupt in-
fluence reaches to the highest levels of the Russian Govern-
ment,75 a belief for which there is ample precedent.76 Through-
68. Timothy Heritage, Yeltsin Worries Criminals Will Enter Parliament, REUTER
TEXTLINE, Oct. 13, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
69. Paper Says Zhirinovsky Tied to Mob, Moscow TIMES, Oct. 6, 1994, at 4.
70. Zhirinovsky and Mafia, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, Oct. 5, 1994, at 1 (noting that
Sergei Goroshkov, whom Russian police suspect of involvement in numerous money-
laundering schemes, has donated over US$300,000 to Zhirinovsky's party).
71. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 70. As noted above, the genesis of the
bureaucracy-mob partnership was the black market during the Soviet period. Id.
72. Id. at 88.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 320.
75. Shchekochikhin, supra note 32, at 191.
Today's [Russian] mafia... [are] the same as before-the ones who had the
power to sign documents giving someone the right to do something .... A
woman whose husband works close to Yeltsin told me that if her husband can
organize the signature of the three top persons in the government on a license
to export oil, his commission will be $50 million.
Id.
76. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 335.
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out the Soviet era, the Communist Party was largely seen as the
most powerful of all criminal organizations.77 The Party con-
trolled not just one aspect of an illicit economy but the entirety
of a nation and its resources. 78
The Russian Mafiya also represents an attitude, not merely
an organization. This attitude, developed during the years of
Communist Party rule, is rooted in the belief, held by many gov-
ernment officials to this day, that if something is not nailed
down, or placed within their power, they can treat it as their own
property. 79 These former Communist apparachiks are not ad-
verse to taking, selling, or auctioning off to the highest bidder
any thing or authority entrusted to them. In some instances,
businessmen have "rented" government-owned airplanes to
transport goods.80 Such incidents only came to light after the
rented planes were overloaded with cargo and subsequently
crashed."' In addition, corrupt former Communist, now Rus-
sian, officials have sold secret military hardware to the United
States,82 indicating that if the price is right, even treason is not
an impediment to a lucrative deal.83
One must not be mislead by the attitude held by a large
number of Russians that anyone who engages in commercial ac-
77. DAVID REMICK, LENIN'S TOMB: THE LAST DAYS OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE 183
(1993).
78. Id. at 183.
The Communist Party apparatus was the most gigantic mafia the world has
ever known. It guarded its monopoly on power with a sham consensus and
constitution and backed it up with the force of the KGB and the Interior Min-
istry police. There were also handsome profits. The Party had so obviously
socked away money abroad and sold off national resources, including the
country's vast gold reserves, that after the collapse of the August coup, the
Party's leading financial officer took a look into the future and threw himself
off a high balcony to his death.
Id.
79. Somebody Put a Dollar Bill in His Hand, supra note 1, at 1. See also Kirov Embroiled
in Bribery Scandal, Moscow TRIB., Oct. 13, 1995, at 1. Government-appointed director
of the Kirov Ballet, now the Marinsky Ballet in Russia, was arrested for allegedly taking
bribes to grant the right to organize the company's foreign tours. Id. Bribe-taking was
supposedly a routine practice at the ballet when dealing with foreign partners. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. John Mintz & Benjamin Weiser, Secret Deals Bring Russia's Secret Weapons to U.S.,
WASH. PosT, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al. The Pentagon paid US$50 million for an advanced
Russian air defense system that it plans to assemble in the United States to test its ability
to spot U.S. planes and missiles. Id.
83. Id. at All; see COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 235-36.
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tivity, who buys and sells, or who is from the Caucasus region,84 is
a member of the Mafiya. As one observer notes, during the com-
munist era, the term "mafiya" "became the mutter of explana-
tion for every shortage and inequity, and only foreigners made
the mistake of thinking the term referred exclusively to the hus-
tlers at the bottom of the criminal structure."85 Mafiya means
many things to many people, especially Russians, but when the
term is defined as government corruption and organized crime
it is a real, current, and dangerous Russian problem.
B. The Mafiya and the Russian Government
During the Soviet era, the Mafiya and government officials
formed partnerships that controlled the lucrative "black" and
"grey" markets of the Soviet Union. 6 Nonetheless, as one spe-
cialist observes, "communist authorities themselves, however,
took second place to no one in criminal behavior .... Russians
first began to use the word 'Mafiya' in [the 1970's and 1980's] to
describe the large networks of corruption lurking inside regional
and central [government] ministries." 7 Regional party chiefs
became their own regional chieftains, feudal overlords of vast
criminal networks. 8  The Government and the Mafiya became
one.89 In 1993, the Russian Security Ministry reported that
"more than half of Russia's criminal groups had close ties with
government ministries and agencies."9
The Russian Mafiya is distinctively menacing in light of its
close connections with key sections of the government bureau-
84. See Shevardnadze, Reclaiming Job, Appeals to Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at
A6 (discussing Shevardnadze's visit to "troubled Caucasus nation").
85. REMicK, supra note 77, at 202.
86. Handelman, supra note 11, at 86.
87. Id.
88. REMicK, supra note 77, at 181.
Once installed as republican Party chief, [Geidar] Aliyev [Communist Party
boss of Azerbaijan] ruled Azerbaijan as surely as the Gambino family ran the
port of New York. The Caspian Sea caviar mafia, the Sumgait oil mafia, the
fruits and vegetables mafia-they all reported to him, enriched him, wor-
shipped him .... [Jiudges, police captains, and prosecutors were generally
well fed and not meant to stand up for anything more than their share of the
booty.
Id.
89. Id.
90. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 130.
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cracy.91 While it is true that as the Communist Party faded from
power, more conventional organized criminal structures
emerged, these connections persist.92 It is estimated that the
Russian criminal world spends fifty percent of its income on
bribes to government officials alone.93 Nor is it unusual for un-
derpaid Russian government employees to seek out criminal
groups to offer their services.94
C. The Russian Mafiya in the United States
The Russian Mafiya has been operating in the United States
for years.95 With the fall of the Soviet Union, the activities of
Russian organized crime groups have spread in the United States
and Europe and it is possible that such groups possess the capa-
bility to steal nuclear weapons or weapons-grade nuclear materi-
als.9 6 Recently, several professional Russian hockey players in
the United States have complained of being shaken down by
Russian Mafiya members who demand money in exchange for
protecting the players' families.97
Moreover, smuggled Russian commodities have negatively
impacted the world commodities markets,98 as a result of which
five-thousand U.S. smelter jobs were lost in 1994.11 Presently,
the U.S. and Russian Governments are cooperating in efforts to
combat criminals operating in the United States and Russia.10 °
The FBI has assigned agents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,
while U.S. Department of Justice prosecutors currently reside in
Moscow. Presumably, these individuals will continue to seek and
enforce effective measures to combat crime "imported" from
91. Handelman, supra note 11, at 84.
92. REMICK, supra note 77, at 522.
93. Alexander Kryshstanovskaya, Bribety Cost of Business for Mafiya, IzvSTIA, Sept.
21, 1995.
94. Id.
95. Friedman, supra note 12; see Jo Durden-Smith, Marks of a Criminal Elite, Mos-
cow TIMES, June 4, 1994, at 9.
96. Russian Mafia Spreading in U.S. and Europe, Moscow TRIB., May 26, 1994, at 2.
The National Academy of Sciences described the stockpiles of Russian weapons grade
plutonium as "a clear and present danger to [U.S.] national ... security." Id.; Jessica
Mathews, Beware the Loose Nukes, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1995, at 20.
97. Gennady Fyodorov & Randall Smathers, Violent Times for Post-Soviet Sport, Mos-
cow TIMES, May 18, 1995, at 18.
98. COMRADE CUMINAL, supra note 10, at 252.
99. Id.
100. Russian Businessman Accused of Extortion, Moscow TIaB., May 18, 1992, at 3.
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Russia.'°
VI. CRIME AND BUSINESS: Doing Business in Russia
Bribe-taking is standard practice among Russian Govern-
ment officials,10 2 a fact of which the Yeltsin Administration is
well aware.1 13 In 1994, the Yeltsin Government reported that
seventy to eighty percent of private businesses were paying extor-
tion money to organized criminal gangs.1 0 4 Eighty percent of all
U.S. businesses in Russia have bribed a Russian government offi-
cial at least once. 10
5
It is not uncommon for businesses in Russia to employ assas-
sins in the collection of business debts. 106 In 1993, organized
crime controlled forty percent of the turnover in goods and serv-
ices in Russia, according to the Russian Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs. 10 7 Moreover, the growth of organized crime has severely
hampered the growth of private small businesses in the Coun-
try. 10
101. Klaidman, supra note 13, at 12. The Director of the FBI's visit to the former
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc emerging democracies is but one example.
102. Somebody Put a Dollar Bill in His Hand, supra note 1, at 2.
103. Leonid Bershidsky, Aids Say State Loans Still Open to Bribery, Moscow TIMES,
July 13, 1994, at 1-2. Officials in the Yeltsin Administration admitted that bribes often
determine who and what organizations get government loans and assistance. Id.
104. Yudin, supra note 62, at 1.
105. Louise Shelley, Statement on the Post-Soviet Organized Crime for Committee
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 4 (June 10, 1994).
106. Bombings Continue, Moscow TRIB., June 9, 1992, at 1, 6. Bombings have be-
come the favored means for settling scores by the Russian Mafiya with businessmen. Id.
Russian organized crime groups demonstrate little concern for innocent bystanders,
evidenced by the fact that a number of innocent bystanders have been killed by bombs
intended for businessmen. Id.
107. COMRADE CRIMINAL, supra note 10, at 238 .
108. Sonny Efron, Russian Farmer's Road to Market Runs Afoul of Chaotic Distribution
and Organized Criminals, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1994, at 12. Tatyana Vasilyeva, President
of the local Krasnodar branch of the Association of Russian Pheasant Farms and Agri-
cultural Cooperatives ("AKKOR"), which represents 16,680 private farmers, com-
mented that "[it is really scary, but despite the fact that the markets are empty, it's still
impossible to sell your produce in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large Russian cit-
ies." Id. She also noted that:
[H]ighway robbers, traffic police who demand payola in exchange for free
passage and pay offs to local gangsters make a mockery of a free market ....
[F]armers were stopped at the outskirts of the city, where racketeers together
with corrupt traffic police insisted that the contents of the truck be handed
over at rock-bottom prices.
Id. Much of this "criminal" problem is also due to the crushing Russian regulations and
taxation that drives even legitimate businessmen underground. See U.S. Business and the
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VII. AMERICAN BUSINESSES IN RUSSIA
A now standard remark among Americans in Moscow is that
the United States won the Cold War. Evidence of this may be
seen on virtually every block in the center of Moscow. Advertise-
ments for U.S. soft drinks, candy, cigarettes, and other products
decorate virtually every kiosk in the city. Panel vans roll by the
Kremlin advertising U.S. air conditioning and heating, construc-
tion, and oil companies. The presence of U.S. business in Russia
is undeniable. As one of the last great markets in the World
slowly opens up, U.S. businesses and businessmen will continue
to work and do business in Russia. Along with the sizable and
lucrative opportunities that the Russian market represents, how-
ever, a business presence in Russia is accompanied by a number
of risks and pitfalls.
It is estimated that twenty percent of all foreigners engaged
in business in St. Petersburg currently pay protection money to
the Russian Mafiya.'0 In 1994, U.S. companies and individuals
doing business in Russia became a target of Russian criminals.1 °
U.S. firms have been forced to pay protection money, expend
large sums on security, or leave the Country altogether.11 Such
additional burdens of doing business in Russia may, in time,
compel U.S. businesses to choose between leaving the Russian
market or violating U.S. law if bribe-paying to Russian govern-
ment officials continues to be an unavoidable consequence of
doing business in the region.
Already, it is well-known that bribing government officials
has become a method of doing business for some U.S. businesses
operating in Russia,"' despite the fact that such acts are illegal
under both Russian and U.S. law. Indeed, many individuals and
companies who pay bribes do so knowing full well that they risk
payment of substantial fines or loss of personal freedom should
their activities amount to criminal behavior under either legal
regime.
Russian Mob, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at Cl. A U.S. lawyer who is working in Russia has
said that "official corruption, an irrational system of levying taxes, and a lasting mistrust
of profit still hurt American businesses far more than crime does." Id.
109. Matt Bivens, Petersburg Mafia Targets Foreigners, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994,
at 4.
110. U.S. Business and the Russian Mob, supra note 108, at C1.
111. Id.
112. Shelley, supra note 105, at 4.
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VIII. THE FCPA
The FCPA was enacted in reaction to Watergate and to the
discovery of widespread bribery of foreign government officials
by U.S. businessmen abroad. 113 The FCPA, which prohibits such
bribery,'1 4 has had a checkered history..'15 Because the FCPA is
almost impossible to enforce without the cooperation of foreign
governments, successful prosecutions under the statute have
usually been accompanied by cooperation in the investigations
by the foreign government involved.1
16
The FCPA has also come under severe criticism by U.S. busi-
ness groups, which have complained that the act is too vague.
Moreover, because the United States acted alone in attempting
to curtail corrupt practices abroad, the Act placed U.S. busi-
nesses operating abroad at a severe competitive disadvantage.
11 7
Nonetheless, in recent years, other industrialized nations have
begun to realize that official corruption, whether it occurs at
home or abroad, is against the national interest.118 In 1994, a
committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development11 ("OECD") approved a policy aimed at stamping
113. See Pat Towell & Barry M. Hager, Foreign Bribes: Stiff Penalties Proposed, 35
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 929 (1977) (noting that during Watergate investigations, it was
discovered that numerous U.S. corporations had slush funds for making illegal political
payments that escaped notice by routine accounting audits and that these payments
included bribes paid to foreign government officials).
114. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1988) (Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (1977), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 5001-5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25).
115. See Sherry Sontag, Bribery a Close Call: Is New Legislation Really Needed?, NAT'L
L.J., May 9, 1988 (noting that while there have been several prominent cases, number
of cases brought and penalties imposed under Act have been minimal); 2 Foreign Cor-
rupt Pracs. Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 635-99.005.
116. SeeJAMES STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS 18-86 (1987) (discussing investigation
of alleged bribery of Pakistani officials by McDonnell Douglas Corporation and its em-
ployees in order to secure aircraft sales to Pakistani national airline).
117. See 126 Cong. Rec. S2550 (daily ed. May 28, 1980); Hearings on S. 708, supra
note 28, at 1-2 (statement of Sen. D'Amato); see also Lanpher & Phillips, Time Has Come
for Overhaul of Foreign Bribery Act, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 30, 1981, at 29; Senator Heinz Rein-
troduces Proposal to Amend Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Uan.-Junel Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) No. 7, at 318 (Feb. 15, 1985).
118. Code on Corruption Advanced, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1994, at A13.
119. The OECD was created pursuant to treaty between its member countries.
The OECD Treaty came into force on September 30, 1961. Its member countries in-
clude Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zea-'
land, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
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out corruption and bribery of government officials in interna-
tional commercial transactions. 120 The new code "represents a
commitment to effective measures based upon agreement that
corruption is both harmful to fair competition and to the polit-
ical process."1 2 1  It is doubtful, however, if this code will be
adopted by other industrial nations without strong leadership
and persistent prodding from the United States.
In response to complaints from U.S. businesses along the
lines discussed above, the U.S. Congress amended the FCPA in
1988.122 The amendments narrowed the "knowledge" require-
ment of illicit payments by third persons, set forth in the statute.
U.S. businesses may now be liable under the FCPA for payments
made by third persons to foreign government officials only if the
business has a "firm belief" that the illegal payments will be
made by the third person, or that such payments are likely to
occur. 23 The amendments also permitted certain types of pay-
the United States. See Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations to End Business Bribes,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at A10.
While all the OECD countries have laws against domestic corruption, most of
these rules do not apply to what their businessmen do abroad. On the con-
trary, most industrialized countries allow businessmen to deduct payoffs and
kickbacks, commonly described as "commissions" or "fees or promotional
costs," from their taxable income as a legitimate foreign business expense.
Id.
120. Code on Corruption Advanced, supra note 118, at A13.
121. Id.
122. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title V,
§ 5003(c), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1419.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (1994). The 1988 amendments replaced the reason to
know standard with a knowing requirement in an attempt to make the law less vague. It
is not clear that Congress was successful in its attempt. See Keith Burt, Yeltsin Decree on
Anti-Corruption, U.S. Law Put Investors in Difficult Dilemma, RussiA & COMMONWEALTH
Bus. L. REI'r., Sept. 21, 1992; Dale Turza, Corrupt Practices Act: How Far Have We Come?,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 5, 1990, at 5-6. The 1988 Amendment states that:
(A) A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to conduct, a circum-
stance, or a result if -
(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct,
that such circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to
occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that
such result is substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required
for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of the existence of such circumstance does not exist.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (f) (2), -2(h)(3) (1994). The 1988 Conference report made clear
that behaving like an ostrich will not exempt a business from liability under the Act.
H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 920 (1988).
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ments. "Grease" payments, or payments made to facilitate or ex-
pedite the performance of a routine government action, were
exempted from prosecution under the FCPA.124 One example
of a grease payment would be paying a customs official to per-
form his or her routine duties in a timely fashion. In addition, a
business may raise an affirmative defense if the payment made
was legal under the laws of the official's country. 125 Moreover,
reasonable incurred costs such as travel and lodging to demon-
strate a product or perform a contract with a foreign govern-
ment are permissible under the amendments.2 6
Despite extensive, congressionally-mandated lobbying by
the U.S. Government's foreign relations sections of foreign gov-
ernments, no other governments currently prohibit bribery of
foreign officials.'1 7  This situation may change, however, with
the adoption of a foreign-corrupt-practices-type act by the
OECD. l2 . The OECD code would require that all industrialized
nations prohibit bribery of foreign government officials. 12 9
124. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b)-2(b) (1994). "Routine governmental action" is defined
as an action that is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign governmental
official in:
i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a per-
son to do business in a country;
ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
iii)providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling
inspections related to the transit of goods across country;
iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unload-
ing cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deteriora-
tion; or
v) actions of similar nature.
Id. § 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A).
"Routine governmental action" is not:
[Any decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award new
business to or to continue business with a particular party, or any action taken
by a foreign official involved in the decision-making process to encourage a
decision to award new business to or continue business with a particular party.
Id. § 78dd-1 (f) (3) (B).
125. Id. § 78dd-1(c)(I)-2(c)(1).
126. Id. § 78dd-I (c) (2).
127. Id. § 78dd-1 note. The 1988 amendments to the FCPA required that the ex-
ecutive seek to create an FCPA type agreement with the members of the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").
128. Code on Corruption Advanced, supra note 118, at A13. A committee of the
OECD approved a policy aimed at stamping out corruption and bribery of Government
officials in international commercial transactions. Id. The new code "represents a com-
mitment to effective measures based upon agreement that corruption is both harmful
to fair competition and to the political process." Id.
129. Id. The full text of the OECD's Recommendation is as follows:
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Thus, presently, while all industrialized nations prohibit bribery
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL OF THE OECD
On Bribery in International Business Transactions
THE COUNCIL,
HAVING REGARD to Article 5 bb) of the Convention on the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development of 14th December 1960;
HAVING REGARD to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which ex-
hort enterprises to refrain from bribery of public servants and holders of public office
in their operations;
CONSIDERING that bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business
transactions, including trade and investment, raising serious moral and political con-
cerns and distorting international competitive conditions;
RECOGNIZING that all OECD Member countries have legislation that makes the
bribing of their public officials and taking of bribes by these officials a criminal offense
while only a few Member countries have specific laws making the bribing of foreign
officials a punishable offense;
CONVINCED that further action is needed on both the national and international
level to dissuade both enterprises and public officials from resorting to bribery when
negotiating international business transactions and that an OECD initiative in this area
could act as a catalyst for global action;
CONSIDERING that such action should take fully into account the differences that
exist in jurisdictional and other legal principles and practices in this area;
CONSIDERING that a review of the mechanisms would assist Member countries in
implementing this recommendation and in evaluating the steps taken and the results
achieved;
On the proposal of the Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises;
GENERAL
I. RECOMMENDS that Member countries take effective measures to deter, prevent and
combat the bribery of foreign public officials in connection with international business
transactions.
II. CONSIDERS that, for the purposes of this Recommendation, bribery can involve the
direct or indirect offer or provision of any undue pecuniary or other advantage to or for
a foreign public official, in violation of the official's legal duties, in order to obtain or
retain business [The notion of bribery in some countries also includes advantages to or
for members of a law-making body, candidates for a law-making body or public office
and officials of political parties.]
DOMESTIC ACrION
Ill. RECOMMENDS that each Member country examine the following areas and, in con-
formity with its jurisdictional and other basic legal principles, take concrete and mean-
ingful steps to meet this goal. These steps may include:
i) criminal laws, or their application, in respect of the bribery of foreign
public officials;
ii) civil, commercial, administrative laws and regulations so that bribery
would be illegal;
iii) tax legislation, regulations and practices, insofar as they may indi-
rectly favour bribery;
iv) company and business accounting requirements and practices in or-
der to secure adequate recording of relevant payments;
v) banking, financial and other relevant provisions so that adequate
records would be kept and made available for inspection or investigation; and
vi) laws and regulations relating to public subsidies, licenses, government
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of their own officials, only the United States prohibits the brib-
ery of foreign government officials.130
The FCPA prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign offi-
procurement contracts, or other public advantages so that advantages could
be denied as a sanction for bribery in appropriate cases.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IV. RECOMMENDS that Member countries in order to combat bribery in international
transactions, in conformity with their jurisdictional and other basic legal principles,
take the following actions:
i) consult and otherwise cooperate with appropriate authorities in other
countries in investigations and other legal proceedings concerning specific
cases of such bribery through such means as sharing of information (sponta-
neous or "upon request"), provision of evidence, and extradition;
ii) make full use of existing agreements and arrangements for mutual
international legal assistance and where necessary, enter into new agreements
or arrangements for this purpose;
iii) ensure that their national laws afford an adequate basis for this coop-
eration.
REGULATIONS WITH NON-MEMBERS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
V. APPEALs to non-Member countries to join the OECD in combating bribery in inter-
national business transactions and to take full account of the terms of this recommen-
dation.
VI REQUESTS the Secretariat to consult with international organizations and interna-
tional financial institutions on effective means to combat bribery as an aid to promote
the policy of good governance.
VII. INVIrEs Member countries to promote anti-corruption policies within and beyond
the OECD area and, in their dealings with non-Member countries, to encourage them
to join in the effort to combat such bribery in accordance with this recommendation.
FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES
VIII INSTRUCTS the Committee on International Investment and multinational Enter-
prises to monitor implementation and follow-up of this recommendation. For this pur-
pose, the Committee is invited to establish a Working Group on Bribery in Interna-
tional Business Transactions and in particular:
i) to carry out regular reviews of steps taken by Member countries to im-
plement this Recommendation, and to make proposals appropriate to assist
members in its implementation;
ii) to examine specific issues relating to bribery in international business
transactions;
iii) to provide a forum for consultations;
iv) to explore the possibility of associating non-Members with this work;
and
v) in close cooperation with the Committee on Fiscal Affairs, to examine
the fiscal treatment of bribery, including the issue of tax deductibility of
bribes.
IX. INSTRUCTS the Committee to report to the Council after the first regular review and
as appropriate thereafter, and to review this Recommendation within three years after
its adoption. OECD Press Release SG/Press (94) (36). Attachment dated Paris, 27th
May 1994.
130. Code on Corruption Advanced, supra note 118, at A13.
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cials to secure business advantages, and requires U.S. companies
to maintain stringent accounting standards so as to prelude the
establishment of "slush funds" to provide funds for such illicit
payments.' The FCPA specifically prohibits the payment of
bribes to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing any offi-
cial decision, omission, or act by that official in violation of the
official duty of that foreign official to enable a U.S. business to
obtain or maintain business in that foreign land.13 2 Payments to
a third party for the purposes of paying a bribe to a foreign offi-
cial are also prohibited if the payor has knowledge of the illicit
nature of the payment. 3 The FCPA pertains to all U.S. busi-
nesses13 4 and to any employee, agent, director, official, or stock-
holder who acts on behalf of an issuer of securities or domestic
concern in violation of the Act. 135
The U.S. DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") are jointly responsible for enforcing the FCPA. The
SEC handles civil actions pertaining to the enforcement of ac-
counting procedures and civil violations of the FCPA by issuers
of securities." 6 The DOJ handles all criminal proceedings
under the FCPA, as well as civil proceedings that do not pertain
to issuers of securities.13 7 , The 1988 amendments to the Act em-
powered the U.S. Attorney General to provide guidelines to U.S.
businesses on how to comply with the Act138 and to provide opin-
131. 26 U.S.C. § 162(c) (1) (1994). The tax deductibility of a payment made to an
official or employee of a foreign government is governed by § 162(c) (1) of the Internal
Revenue Code. Id. Under current U.S. law, no tax deduction is permitted if the pay-
ment in question is "unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977." Id.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (a), -2(a) (amended in 1988).
133. Id. § 78dd-1 (a) (3)-2(a) (3) (1977) (amended in 1988).
134. Id. § 78c(a) (8) (1977) (amended in 1988). This section maintains jurisdic-
tion of the act over "issuers of securities" who are any person (s) who issues or intends to
issue any security. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (1988) defines a domestic concern as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, busi-
ness trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under
the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or common-
wealth of the United States.
Id.
135. Id. § 78dd-1(a)-2(a) (1988).
136. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.CA.N. 4098, 4101.
137. Id.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(d)-2(e) (1994).
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ions on the legality of contemplated payments by U.S. businesses
to foreign officials. ' o An opinion issued by the Attorney Gen-
eral creates a rebuttable presumption that the payment made
was legal under the Act.'40
The joint responsibility of the DOJ and SEC has created a
bureaucratic rivalry that has adversely impacted enforcement of
the Act. Thus far, the two agencies have demonstrated an un-
willingness to cooperate in FCPA investigations."' In addition, a
plea agreement obtained by the DOJ does not necessarily pre-
clude an action by the SEC. 142
In the 1988 amendments to the FCPA, Congress increased
the penalties for violating the Act, imposing a maximum
US$10,000 civil fine for violations;' 43 a maximum criminal pen-
alty for individuals of US$100,000; 1'44 and a maximum criminal
fine for U.S. corporations of US$2 million. 43
The FCPA does not provide for a private right of action.' 46
Under the Act, U.S. businesses harmed by bribery abroad must,
therefore, seek a remedy by addressing their complaints directly
to the U.S. Government.' 47
IX. THE FCPA AAD RUSSIA
To date, no FCPA case involving U.S. businesses in Russia
has arisen. U.S. businesses should not, however, be lulled into a
false sense of security. Crime has become the number one polit-
ical issue in Russia and the U.S. Government is seeking ways to
assist Russia in its fight against crime.'48 The FBI has opened an
139. Id. § 78dd-1(e)-2(f) (1994).
140. Id. § 78dd-1(e)-2(f) (1994).
141. 2 Foreign Corrupt Pracs. Act Rep. (Business Laws, Inc.) 609-99.005.
142. Id.
143. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g) (1) (B), 78ff(c) (1) (B) (1994).
144. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g) (2) (A), 78ff(c) (2) (A). Previously, the maximum fine was
US$10,000.
145. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g) (1) (A), 78ff(c) (1) (A). The previous fine was US$1 million.
146. Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Ref. Co., 771 F. Supp. 600, 606-07
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); Sheilds ex rel. Sundstrand Corp. v. Erickson, 710 F. Supp. 686, 688
(N.D. Ill. 1989); Lewis ex rel. National Semiconductor Corp. v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp.
1316, 1328-34 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
147. Citicorp Int'l Trading Co., 771 F. Supp. at 606-07; Sheilds ex rel. Sundstrand Corp.,
710 F. Supp. at 688; Lewis ex rel. National Semiconductor Corp., 612 F. Supp. at 1328-34.
148. See Ministry, FBI Sign Deal on Cooperation, Moscow TIMES, July 6, 1994, at 3.
FBI Director Freeh said Russian Mafiya gangs were involved in the United States in
drug-trafficking, tax and bank frauds, kidnapping, and murders. Id. According to Rus-
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office in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the DOJ has two full-
time prosecutors working in Moscow. 14 9
Those instances of successful prosecution under the FCPA
have arisen when foreign governments have cooperated in the
investigation of acts of corruption in their own countries.15 ° The
current administration in Russia has expressed its desire to root
out corruption in government, although some legislators and ex-
members of the Yeltsin Administration have claimed this is not
the case. 15 ' Nevertheless, a change in leadership in Russia in the
next few years could pave the way for vigorous enforcement of
the FCPA 52 If a new Russian administration were to make com-
bating official corruption a priority, cooperation with the United
sian Interior Ministry statistics, there are 150 Russian Mafiya gangs operating all over
the world, 24 of them in the United States. Id.
149. The DOJ prosecutors are in Moscow as part of the DOJ/ABA-CEELI Organ-
ized Crime Project in Russia.
150. STEWART, supra note 116, at 27. The author notes that:
[I]n Pakistan, President Bhutto had been swept out of office and power had
been seized by General Muhammad Zia. Zia was in no way threatened by an
investigation of events that occurred during the regime of his predecessor,
indeed, Lubin [federal prosecutor] hoped that he might persuade the present
Pakistani government that it was in its own interest to investigate and publicize
corruption in the previous regime.
Id. The cooperation of a succeeding, rival government can be a tremendous help to a
bribery investigation. Id. at 18-86 (also discussing investigation of alleged bribery of
Pakistani officials by McDonnell Douglas Corporation and its employees in order to
secure aircraft sales to Pakistani national airline).
151. Senators Take Alternative Path to Opposition, Moscow TRIB., Oct. 29, 1994, at 2.
Russian Senator Yuri Boldyrev of Saint Petersburg is a co-founder of the Yabloko faction
in the Russian parliament. Id. The article notes that "two years ago, [Mr. Boldyrev]
headed the control department of the Kremlin when his anti-corruption investigations
got too close for comfort to high-ranking officials. President Yeltsin, Boldyrev says,
asked him orally to halt an investigation of Moscow. When he refused, Yeltsin dismissed
him." Id.
152. Leonid Bershidsky, Reformers Face Crisis in 1995, Moscow TIMES, Dec. 31,
1994, at 1. This scenario would be most likely in the event of Yeltsin's not being re-
elected in June of 1996, when presidential elections are currently scheduled. Id. In
recent polls, Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko faction, which includes respected
economists, diplomats, and corruption fighters who "have not been treated well" by the
Yeltsin Administration, is the leader among possible presidential candidates. Id. If Mr.
Yavlinsky were elected he would be a prime candidate for moving strongly against cor-
ruption in the Russian Government, and could be a potential partner with the United
States in such a fight. Mr. Yavlinsky has expressed his conviction that Russia will be-
come a criminalized society if corrupt influences are not weeded out of government.
See Russia's Choice Is Reform or Crime, supra note 58, at 10. Recent events in Korea, where
the former president has been jailed for taking bribes, is a recent example of political
opponents punishing their former rivals for corruption. See also Mary Jordan, Indict-
ments of Ex-President, Business Chiefs Rock S. Korea, WAsH. POST, Dec. 6, 1995, at Al.
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States on FCPA investigations would be an effective means of
striking at, and severely curtailing, sources of bribe money.1 53
Clearly, by working together, the Russian and U.S. govern-
ments could apply the FCPA to root out and punish corrupt Rus-
sian government officials and U.S. businessmen who are making
illicit payments to facilitate business deals. The two governments
may already be working on such a cooperative eff6rt.1'5 Thus,
U.S. businesses should beware. U.S. businesses should exert all
possible efforts to ensure compliance with the FCPA to prevent
future legal problems.
X. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS
Whatever harm the FCPA may inflict upon U.S. business
competitiveness in Russia, the Act is a method by which the Gov-
ernment may restrain U.S. businesses from undermining U.S.
foreign policy interests. 155 In the case of Russia, the United
States has spent billions of dollars in foreign aid to promote the
development of democracy and a market economy in Russia. If
U.S. businesses were permitted to bribe Russian officials and be-
come part of the corrupting influences on the nascent Russian
democratic Government, this would be, at the least, harmful and
possibly fatal, to the goals of U.S. foreign policy.'56
If the U.S. Government is serious about the establishment of
democracy in Russia, it should take full and vigorous measures
to prevent the bribery of Russian officials by U.S. citizens. One
such measure should be the creation of a reporting mechanism
between the U.S. and Russian governments that would enable
U.S. businesses to report requests for bribes by Russian govern-
ment officials.' 57 There should also be increased cooperation
between U.S. and Russian law enforcement officials on criminal
matters, specifically with respect to bribery.
153. Bershidsky, supra note 152, at 1.
154. Pyotr Yudin, Ministry, FBI Sign Deal on Cooperation, Moscow TIMES, July 6,
1994, at 3. The United States and Russia have already agreed to exchange information
in their fight against organized crime and corruption. Id.
155. The FCPA was primarily designed to protect the integrity of U.S. foreign pol-
icy interests. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, (6th Cir. 1990); cert. denied 498
U.S. 1086; see Bader and Shaw, Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt.Practices Act, 15 Ir'L L.
& POL. 627 (1983) (noting that "corporate bribery may be said to be 'destructive to the
best interests of our foreign policy' ") (citing 123 Cong. Rec. 1517 (Jan. 18, 1977).
156. See Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1028.
157. There is precedent for this type of cooperation. See Yudin, supra note 154, at
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XI. ADVICE TO U.S. BUSINESSES
Discussions with U.S. businesses indicate that many U.S.
businesses have a cavalier attitude about doing business in Rus-
sia. In large part, this attitude is the result of the fact that such
businessmen view bribery of Russian government officials as a
necessary evil, and not at all out of the ordinary. Many young
MBA158 graduates working in Russia have never heard of the
FCPA,1 9 a fact that may spell disaster for the future of some U.S.
corporations doing business in the region.
As mentioned above, those instances of successful prosecu-
tions under the FCPA have occurred when a foreign government
has proved willing to cooperate in anti-corruption measures.
Russia is increasingly showing signs of such a willingness to coop-
erate. 1
60
Crime and corruption is the predominant political issue in
Russia. A government such as Russia's, which has a relatively
good relationship with the U.S. Government, is an ideal partner
for the United States in carrying out FCPA investigations and
prosecutions. 61 U.S. businesses should, therefore, ensure that
their operations in Russia are in full compliance with the FCPA.
To protect their interests in Russia, the U.S. business com-
munity should: 1) ensure that they exercise adequate controls
over the activities of their representatives in Russia; 2) pressure
the U.S. Government to create, through diplomatic channels, a
mechanism by which requests for bribes by Russian officials and
dishonest activity by government officials may be submitted to
the Russian Government for prosecution; 3) pressure the Rus-
sian Government to enact more effective anti-bribery legislation;
and 4) pressure Congress to grant a private right of action under
the FCPA, in order to make the anti-bribery laws more "self-po-
licing" within the business community.
158. Masters in Business Administration.
159. The Author has conducted an admittedly unscientific survey of young and
not-so-young U.S. businessmen doing business in Russia. Only a few have indicted any
knowledge of the existence of the FCPA and these few were not resident in Russia.
Those resident in Russia were completely ignorant of U.S. anti-bribery laws.
160. See Crime Fighter Lauds Cooperation, Moscow TRIB., Aug. 6, 1994, at 5; Steve
Liesman & Paul Podolsky, U.S., Russia Cooperate to Catch Tax Cheats, Moscow TIMFS,
June 2, 1994, at 1; Mafia Seized at Gunpoint in Hotel, Moscow TiMES, June 4, 1994, at 1-2.
161. Crime Fighter Lauds Cooperation, supra note 160, at 5 (noting that United States
and Russia are already cooperating in law and tax enforcement); see Liesman & Podol-
sky, supra note 160, at 1.
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Because of the handicap imposed on U.S. businesses by U.S.
laws such as the FCPA, the U.S. Government must be ready and
willing to support and assist U.S. businesses abroad in their ef-
forts to penetrate developing markets such as Russia.
XII. RECOMMENDATIONS ON GOVERNMENT ACTION
The FCPA should be amended to provide for a private right
of action. 162 Furthermore, jurisdiction in such private actions
should be extended to foreign nationals, partnerships, corpora-
tions, and organizations who do business in the United States
and who engage in bribery or other prohibited acts under the
FCPA that adversely affects the business interests of U.S. citizens,
partnerships, or corporations doing business abroad or of non-
U.S. citizens, partnerships, or corporations doing business in the
United States. Such an extension of U.S. jurisdiction would al-
most certainly raise protests from abroad.1 6 3
If the United States is serious about ending bribery of for-
eign government officials, however, it must take stronger action
to persuade other industrialized countries to provide a means by
which their citizens may take similar action. Permitting a private
right of action and extended jurisdiction will certainly send this
message to governments around the World. The U.S. economy
and U.S. businesses have become increasingly international and
the U.S. Government must take a leading role in any effort to
eradicate official corruption and bribery whose sole aim is pecu-
niary gain.
One of the main criticisms of the FCPA is that it places U.S.
businesses at a competitive disadvantage. The institution of a
private right of action under the FCPA should do much to di-
minish this perceived disadvantage. A private right of action
162. See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 216 (1994). The Author argues that the FCPA
should be amended to allow a private right of action among competing U.S. businesses.
Id. This Essay argues that the Act should apply to all competing businesses, both U.S.
and foreign, over Which the court may have jurisdiction. The courts have been willing
to apply the terms of the FCPA to foreigners and to apply the Act extraterritorially. See
Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992).
163. Nonetheless, at the least, OECD Member Nations realize that the domestic
laws of each Member Nation should emphasize combatting bribery of foreign govern-
ment officials. Such action by the United States may be the catalyst required to induce
other nations to prohibit bribery of foreign government officials by nationals, as well as
favorable tax treatment in exchange for bribes under existing domestic laws.
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would provide leverage in U.S. and OECD efforts to achieve
agreement among the World's established democracies to com-
bat bribery of government officials and high-level corruption in
the governments of their trading partners. Making businesses
and businessmen in Germany, Japan, and elsewhere liable under
U.S. law for illicit payments to foreign government officials will,
at a minimum, create a dialogue on bribery and corruption
among the World's democratic trading nations. As noted above,
virtually every nation prohibits bribery of domestic government
officials. Moreover, no nation condones briber as a concept,
and the United States must take the leadership role in unifying
world public opinion in opposition to bribery of foreign govern-
ment officials as well.
CONCLUSION
Change has been a constant in virtually all phases of Russian
life in the past ten years. Chances are that this atmosphere will
continue for another decade.1 64
U.S. businesses and businessmen should expect and, in-
deed, hope that the Russian legal system becomes more predict-
able and efficient. U.S. businesses should also expect continued
cooperation between the U.S. and Russian governments. Ulti-
mately, such cooperation, accompanied by more effective en-
forcement of U.S. laws, could force U.S. businesses to incur sub-
stantial fines as a result of corporate liability under U.S. law if
they do not take precautions to ensure full compliance with the
FCPA when conducting business in Russia. 65
164. See DANIEL YERGIN & THANE GUSTAFSON, RussiA 2010 AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
THE WORLD 119-31 (1993).
165. Lockheed Pleads Guilty to Bribery Conspiracy, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1995, at Cl.
The Lockheed Corporation agreed to pay a.US$24.8 million fine after pleading guilty
to conspiring to bribe an Egyptian politician and to falsifying its financial records. The
article pointed out that:
Federal Prosecutors said that if the criminal case had gone to trial, they would
have shown that Lockheed conspired to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act by paying an Egyptian legislator $1 million for her help in securing an
Egyptian government contract for three C-130H cargo jets worth $79 million.
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